Dog
Days of Summer, a comprehensive exhibition exploring the dog as it
is represented in
photography, video,
and film will be on view from June 3 through September 12 at UCR/California
Museum of
Photography. Featuring over twenty artists, this ambitious
show will be both inquisitive
and entertaining as it explores images
from late 19th century photography through postmodern and
political
deconstructions of the dog and society. Artists among the group include
Diane Arbus,
Roger Ballen, Manuel Carrillo, Jo Ann Callis, William Eggleston,
Elliott Erwitt, Tony Mendoza,
Pedro Meyer, Susan Meiselas, Yoshimoto
Nara, and
Joseph Vitone.
Walking With Cerberus: Anthropomorphism and the Void
Gregory W. Bredbeck, Department of English, UCR
I walk my Cattle Dog, Beau, in a desert where stray dogs are common
(Beau was found here,
umbilical cord intact). Our path typically
crosses theirs without incident. But one dog has joined
us. A
large, dark dog
now parallels us each time, walking the crest of a north running
dune hill a
good ways to the east. The morning light silhouettes
him so
I see few clear details, but he's shaped
like a Rottweiler and
has the breed’s lope. He paces us and shadows our course down
the wash
until it turns west and the dunes turn east and we diverge.
I call him Cerberus after the three-headed canine guardian of the
ancient Greek underworld whom
Odysseus must wrestle into submission
so that
he might be guided through Hades and back. He
is one of two dogs
who figure in Homer’s epic. The other is Argos, the faithful
hound who guards
his master’s doorway while the hero wanders, and who
dies moments after being the sole creature
to recognize Odysseus when
he returns from his almost twenty year journey.
Together Homer’s dogs anthropomorphize the intangible but inviolate
boundaries between life and
death, and between the public and the private,
into humanly knowable forms. They also domesticate
these boundaries
into images compatible with the human psyche. The separation of the
public sphere
of collective interaction from the private sphere of
individual autonomy is in practice loosely defined
and shifting; Argos
reifies and stills the line that separates the public—the town
square where suitors
wait to take the hand of Penelope, Odysseus’s
wife—from the private—the interior space of individual
authority and familial sustenance—thus allowing the narrative
to move seamlessly across and back
the threshold. Cerebus removes the
omnipresent boundary between life and death to the end of the
world
and guards it with monstrous powers—for all but one epic hero,
there is no risk of premature
transgression. Antithetical helpmeets
at opposite ends of human experience, they are also one and
the same:
each is a dog.
My morning odyssey, though not epic, is still symbolic. When I look
westward and down I see Beau;
eastward and up, I see Cerberus. One
familiar, one unknown. One’s home is my threshold, one is
homeless
and wanders along the brink. Two dogs in such opposition that seeing
one demands that
the other be unseen. But also one and the same: each
is a dog. It is paradox caused by observation.
Further away the two
individuals might appear as one pair, not one near to and one far from
me, but
two in proximity to each other. That a human observer should
cause what he records is known as the
anthropic principle in astrophysical
science. The polarity of the threshold and the brink is not inherent
in the two dogs but adheres to them by my presence as observer.
Cerberus and Argos, therefore, are anthropomorphic projections of
the position humans occupy in a
system of duality. But not all dogs
are
dualistic. In Vedic culture, Hinduism’s Rig Veda (c. 1500 B.C.E)
tells of the dogs of Yama, God of Death: “the watchers, four-eyed,
who look on men and guard the
pathway.” But they are also “Yama’s
two envoys” who “Dark-hued, insatiate, with distended
nostrils…
roam
among the People.” (Book 10, Chapter 14: 10-11) They guard Cerberus’s
boundary between life
and death; but also roam among humans like Argos,
not dying, but rather bringing death and collapsing
the divide between
two discrete ontological realms. They signify not only the brink of
the knowable, but
also the void: the negation of the principium individuationis,
the hypothetical condition which allows “this”
to exist
separate from “that,” creating the possibility of duality.
The dog as void also roams through Western traditions. British folklore
tells of “ghostly black dogs, the
size of large retrievers, about
the fields at night…of such a forbidding aspect that no one
dare venture
to pass them, and that it means death to shout at them.”1
Such hell hounds (which are are the prototype
for Conan Doyle's
The Hounds of the Baskervilles) chaotically collide the knowable
into the ineffable,
and thereby call into question each one’s formal
existence as an independent category exclusive of
the other. They are
the void viewed from duality, reduced to a single concept of death
and personified
by one individual creature, albeit horrific. The hell
hound is Cerberus were Cerberus a stray dog.
Advaitic—non-dualistic —Vedic philosophy, which is not
predicated on the certainty that there is
“this” and “that,” conceives
the void as Atman—conscious-ness and origin—the dependent-arising
cause and effect of Maya, the object of thought which is the illusion
called reality. But to those
imprinted by dualistic cultures certain
of the discrete, formal existence of “this” and “that,” the
void
is Cujo, the personification of Cerberus and Argos minus the differentiation
and distance: the
anthropomorphic projection of the fear that just
beneath every surface is a hell hound waiting to
tear us apart.
I think that Western cultures’ representations of dogs often
meet an urgent need to domesticate
the void and to persuade ourselves
that the fragile boundaries which create the possibility of homo
sapiens—both
as species and as individuals—have permanence and formal
existence. Certainly
most of the time when I look at Beau I see him as him and
me as me—he is that creature which
brings this one pleasure.
But sometimes I look into his eyes and wonder what he is thinking.
I see the amber specks
transform into stars, and the brown motes
meld into earth. There is another universe in Beau
equal but opposite
to
my own. Mine arises from anthropic consciousness, whereas his arises
from, to coin a term from the Greek cyno for dog, cynothropic consciousness;
for a dog being
looked at can also be, like Yama’s dogs, a dog
looking at man, thereby skewering each creature
on the antithetical
poles of a looking subject and an object looked at—poles
which Western duality
must keep mutually exclusive. I have been jolted by
Beau’s intense stare flashing directly back into
my own eyes.
Subject or object, looking or looked: none manage to convey the dissonance
of this
mutually inclusive moment, a moment when I feel, for just a
second, I stop being and two conscious-
nesses meet and reveal themselves
as Atman, the void. At that moment I also know Beau’s thoughts
exactly. As he looks into my eyes he completes a solipsism of mutual
objectification which could
continue infinitely, ironically lending
us the permanence duality seeks in its quest for formal
existence—he
is thinking, I wonder what he is thinking.
1Rev. Worthington-Smith's (1910) “The Lore of Dunstable.” Rpt.
in Gippeswic No.9, June 1994,
GBP1.75 from 42 Cemetery Road, Ipswich,
IP4 2JA